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SECOND CIRCUIT NOTE, 1972 TERM
Since its decision in Candella, the Second Circuit has shown that
it will not readily find that fourth amendment rights have been waived,
and that it will require the prosecutor to satisfy his burden of proving
that a voluntary waiver was made.34 Hopefully, the Candella and
Rothberg decisions are merely aberrations in a Second Circuit policy
of carefully guarding fourth amendment rights.
FEDERAL IMMUNITY OF WiTNEssEs Act
Goldberg v. United States
Under the Federal Immunity of Witnesses Act1 the Government2
may compel testimony considered "necessary to the public interest"3
from unwilling witnesses, in exchange for a grant of immunity.4 The
grant is calculated to circumvent a witness' assertion of his fifth amend-
ment privilege against self-incrimination 5 and thus provide the prose-
Absent a legitimate prior intrusion, plain view of evidence cannot serve to justify
its seizure.
473 F.2d at 1277.
34 See United States v. Mapp, 476 F.2d 67 (2d Cir. 1973) wherein the Second Circuit
reversed a district court denial of a motion to suppress evidence, holding that the defendant
had not voluntarily consented to the search. The court indicated that the government
must prove voluntary consent by "clear and convincing" evidence, id. at 78-79, and held
that the consent was not "unequivocal, specific and intelligently given" because it was
nothing more than "submission to official authority under circumstances pregnant with
coercion." Id. at 77.
In United States v. Ruiz-Estrella, 481 F.2d 723 (2d Cir. 1973), the court, in reversing the
denial of the motion to suppress, held that the Government had shown "no more than
acquiescence to apparent lawful authority." Id. at 728. Judge Hays, dissenting, was of the
opinion that the defendant had consented to the search. Id. at 730.
1 Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Title H, 18 U.S.C. § 6001-05 (1970).
2 This act is applicable to proceedings before a federal court or grand jury, federal
agency, and either house of Congress or its committees. 18 U.S.C. § 6002. For definitions of
the above see id. § 6001. For the procedures used to obtain an immunity order see id.
§ 6003-05.
3 Id. at § 6003. This phrase incorporated the idea that Congress may now apply for the
immunity procedure for any matter which is within its authority. Previous immunity
applications were limited to "national security matters." Measures Relating to Organized
Crime: Hearings on S. 30, S. 974, S. 975, S. 976, S. 1623, S. 1624, S. 1861, S. 2022, S. 2122, and
S. 2292 Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Laws and Procedures of the Senate Comm. on
the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 1st Ses., 292 (1960) [hereinafter cited as Measures Relating to
Organized Crime].
4 18 U.S.C. § 6002.
U "No person... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself... " US. CoNsr. amend. V. A grand jury proceeding is a "criminal case" to which
the fifth amendment privilege applies. Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547, 562 (1892).
For discussions of the historical foundation of the fifth amendment see E. GsuswowD, THn
FTIr AMENDMENT TODAY (1955); L. LEVY, ORIGINs OF TaE FIFTH AiENDMENT (1968);
Pittman, The Colonial and Constitutional History of the Privilege Against Self-Incrimina-
tion in America, 21 VA. L. REV. 763 (1935).
Constitutional attacks on the practice of compelling testimony under immunity grants
on any basis other than the fifth amendment have had little success. "Until now the only
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cution with valuable information. Once immunity under this Act is
conferred, the witness may not remain silent and must answer all ques-
tions or face civil contempt charges. 6
Prior to the Federal Immunity of Witnesses Act, "transactional
immunity" was regarded as the constitutionally required standard.7
testimonial privilege for unofficial witnesses that is rooted in the Federal Constitution is
the Fifth Amendment privilege against compelled self-incrimination." Branzburg v. Hayes,
408 U.S. 665, 689-90 (1972). In Branzburg, newsmen were required to appear and testify
before state or federal grand juries. It was held that compelling them to reveal their
sources of information would not so chill the freedom of speech and press guaranteed by
the first amendment as to override the state's compelling interest in obtaining such
information.
A challenge based on the right to the free exercise of religion also was held inadequate
in Smilow v. United States, 465 F.2d 802 (2d Cir. 1972), which affirmed a contempt citation
for refusal to testify under an immunity grant. The appellant alleged that "as an observant
and committed Jew he must refuse to answer the grand jury questions or else suffer Divine
punishment and ostracism from the Jewish Community as an 'informer."' Id. at 804.
Smilow further contended that to compel him to answer the question would infringe his
sixth amendment right to a fair trial and due process as he had been charged in the state
courts with the crime the grand jury was investigating. The court rejected these arguments,
stating that his "constitutional remedy lies in the fifth amendment privilege...." Id. at
806.
In Fraser v. United States, 452 F.2d 616 (7th Cir. 1971), the Seventh Circuit rejected
an argument that the fourth amendment requires a showing of probable cause or reason-
ableness before a witness may be compelled to testify before a grand jury. Despite the
burgeoning area of the "right of privacy," see Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 115 (1973) (qualified
right to abortion); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (right to contraception), an
argument that compulsory testimony would violate a constitutionally protected zone of
private interest would probably prove futile. "A grand jury subpoena to testify is not that
kind of governmental intrusion on privacy against which the Fourth Amendment affords
protection, once the Fifth Amendment is satisfied." Fraser v. United States, 452 F.2d 616,
620 (7th Cir. 1971). Although the fourth amendment is not the only constitutional source
for the right of privacy, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), it has consistently been held
that once the fifth amendment is satisfied, other arguments will not suffice to override the
legitimate state interest in compelled testimony. See Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591 (1896)
(personal disgrace is not protected by the fifth amendment); accord, Reina v. United States,
364 U.S. 507 (1960); Interstate Commerce Comm'n v. Baird, 194 U.S. 25 (1904). See also
Piemonte v. United States, 367 U.S. 556 (1961) (fear for the safety of one's person or family
not sufficient); Ullman v. United States, 350 U.S. 422 (1956) (loss of jobs, expulsion from
labor unions and other civil liabilities not protected).
6 Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, title III, 28 U.S.C. § 1826 (1970). This section
authorizes civil contempt proceedings against "recalcitrant witnesses." If the defendant still
refuses to cooperate despite a civil contempt citation, the court is also empowered to
impose a criminal contempt citation after notice and a hearing. See Fm. R. CRIM. P. 42(b).
The combination of these sanctions "enable[s] the court to achieve the dual ends of
inducing a ...witness to testify and of punishing his defiance of the court's order to do
so." United States v. Marra, 482 F.2d 1196, 1202 (2d Cir. 1975). See Shillitani v. United
States, 384 U.S. 364 (1966). However, the Second Circuit has recently announced that the
use of summary criminal contempt, pursuant to rule 42(a), as opposed to rule 42(b)
criminal contempt citation, is inappropriate where a witness has refused to testify despite
a grant of immunity. See United States v. Wilson, No. 73-1574 (2d Cir., Nov. 28, 1975);
United States v. Marra, supra.
7 The first federal immunity statute, Act of Jan. 24, 1857, ch. 19, 11 Stat. 155-56, pro-
vided for "transactional" immunity to anyone appearing before congressional investigatory
committees. This was discredited for giving "immunity baths" to witnesses because the
Government had no discretion to withhold the protection. The provision was rewritten
[V7ol. 48:332
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Under that approach, the witness was totally exempt from future pros-
ecution for any criminal acts which he revealed during the grand jury
inquiry." When the Federal Immunity of Witnesses Act was enacted
it incorporated a "use plus derivative use" immunity provision.9 Thus,
the admission of either the compelled testimony or evidence derived
from "leads" provided by such testimony is prohibited in subsequent
prosecutions against the witness. 10 The adoption of this standard set
off a series of constitutional attacks on the Act.11 The Supreme Court,
in 1862 to provide "use" immunity. This was struck down by the Supreme Court in
Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547 (1892).
S In reaction to Counselman, Congress enacted a discretionary "transactional" immunity
statute applicable to proceedings before the Interstate Commerce Commission. It also
added the provision that the testimony must relate to the interrogatory. Act of February
11, 1893, ch. 83, 27 Stat. 443. "[A] statutory enactment, to be valid, must afford absolute
immunity against future prosecution for the offense to which the question relates." Coun-
selman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547, 586 (1892) (emphasis added). Critics of this approach felt
that transactional immunity was too far-reaching in that the fifth amendment did not
prohibit future prosecution of witnesses. See, e.g., Hofstadter & Levittan, Immunity and
the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination- Too Little and Too Much, 39 N.Y.S.B.J.
105, 219 (1967); Note, Witness Immunity Statutes: The Constitutional and Functional
Sufficiency of "Use Immunity", 51 B.U.L. Rv. 616 (1971); Note, The Scope of Testimonial
Immunity Under the Fifth Amendment, 67 Nw. U.L. Rav. 106 (1972); Note, Constitutional
Law: Immunity, The Dilemma of "Transactional" Versus "Use", 25 OKLA. L. RaY. 109
(1972).
9 18 U.S.C. § 6002.
10 This concept is an offshoot of "use" immunity, which only prohibited a prosecutor
from directly submitting a witness' actual immunized testimony as evidence in subsequent
prosecutions against him. See Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547, 564 (1892), where a
"use" immunity statute was discredited because it afforded no practical protection against
the indirect use of a witness' immunized testimony in subsequent prosecutions and was
thereby insufficient to supplant the fifth amendment privilege. Accord, Albertson v. Sub-
versive Activities Control Bd., 382 U.S. 70 (1965).
The basis of the "use plus derivative use" standard was the language in Counselman
that the defect of "use" immunity was that it failed to prevent the indirect use of com-
pelled testimony such as obtaining leads to new evidence. 142 U.S. at 564. The first judicial
sanction of this concept came in Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 79 (1964),
wherein the Court held that a state court may not compel a witness to implicate himself
in federal crimes unless the federal government is prohibited from using the testimony or
its "fruits" in subsequent prosecutions against the witness.
11 See, e.g., United States ex rel. Catena v. Elias, 449 F.2d 40 (3d Cir. 1971); In re
Korman, 449 F.2d 32 (7th Cir. 1971); Stewart v. United States, 440 F.2d 954 (9th Cir. 1971),
(per curiam), aff'd sub nom. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972).
The debate traditionally centered on whether the witness must be free from the threat
of any future prosecution or whether some limitation on the use of his testimony was
sufficient to comport with the protection of the fifth amendment. For the divergent
opinions of the individual Justices see Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 462-67 (1972)
(Douglas, J., dissenting); Piccirillo v. New York, 400 U.S. 548, 562 (1971) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting); Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 92-93 (1964) (White & Stewart, JJ.,
concurring); cf. Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591 (1896).
The circuits also reflected this dispute. The majority favored the transactional im-
munity standard. See, e-g., United States v. Cropper, 454 F.2d 215 (5th Cir. 1971); United
States ex rel. Catena v. Elias, 449 F.2d 40 (3d Cir. 1971); In re Korman, 449 F.2d 32 (7th Cir.
1971). The Ninth Circuit, however, took the position that restrictions on use of the
testimony were adequate. Weg v. United States, 450 F.2d 340 (9th Cir. 1971) (per curiam);
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however, in Kastigar v. United States12 resolved all then existing con-
troversies. The Court held that application of "use plus derivative
use" immunity was constitutionally sufficient in that it afforded pro-
tection to the witness co-extensive with that of the fifth amendment.
The Second Circuit in Goldberg v. United States8 considered
the novel question of whether an actual defendant in a pending prose-
cution could constitutionally be compelled to testify before a federal
grand jury under a grant of "use and derivative use" immunity.' 4 The
court, per Chief Judge Friendly, held that Congress intended to in-
clude such a situation under the Federal Immunity of Witnesses Act 8
and that Kastigar should be extended to hold that a defendant's pro-
tection under a grant of such immunity would equal that of any other
witness.'
Samuel Goldberg, arrested and arraigned in June of 1972, was
charged with possession of treasury bills "known to have been stolen
from a bank in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(c)."'17 Six months later,
he appeared under subpoena before a grand jury inquiring into "pos-
sible violations of federal law on that subject."' 8 Goldberg refused to
testify, relying on his fifth amendment privilege. The court then
granted Goldberg "use and derivative use" immunity and ordered
him to testify. Again Goldberg declined to answer the questions before
the grand jury and was subsequently adjudged in contempt of court.
On appeal, Goldberg argued that it was never the legislative in-
tent of the Federal Immunity of Witnesses Act to compel an actual
defendant to testify under the limited protection of "use plus deriva-
tive use" immunity before a grand jury investigating the very crimes
with which he was charged.19 Furthermore, he contended, while such
protection might be constitutionally sufficient for a mere witness as
per Kastigar, it would be inadequate in his case because his status as a
Stewart v. United States, 440 F.2d 954 (9th Cir. 1971) (per curiam), aff'd sub noma. Kastigar
v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972).
12 406 U.S. 441 (1972). The petitioners, two witnesses not yet arrested or indicted, were
subpoenaed to testify before a grand jury. They refused to testify despite a court order
granting them "use and derivative use" immunity pursuant to the Federal Immunity of
Witnesses Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 6001-05, and were cited for contempt. They claimed that such
immunity was unconstitutional because protection against the "fruits" of such testimony
might prove illusory. For an exhaustive list of academic commentary on Kastigar see Note,
Kastigar v. United States: The Required Scope of Immunity, 58 VA. L. REv. 1099 n.9 (1972).
18472 F.2d 515 (2d Cir. 1978).
14 Id. at 515.
15 Id.
16 Id. at 515-16.
17 Id. at 514.
18Id.
19 Id. at 515.
[Vol. 48:332
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defendant created a "more immediate and less theoretical" 20 risk that
any compelled testimony would facilitate the prosecution currently
against him.21
The court, however, refused to limit the application of the statute
to witnesses in "pre-arrest and pre-arraignment situations." 22 On re-
view of the pertinent provisions23 and their legislative background2
it found nothing to justify such a narrow construction. Furthermore,
since the Act had replaced some 50 transactional immunity statutes
previously scattered throughout the criminal code,25 the court reasoned
that Congress intended "use plus derivative use" immunity to be the
sole standard applicable to all witnesses.26 Therefore, defendants "al-
ready the subject of a criminal complaint for the transaction into
which the grand jury was inquiring"2 7 are to be considered within
the purview of the Federal Immunity of Witnesses Act.
The court also rejected appellant's contention that the Goldberg
facts were distinguishable from Kastigar, and held that "use plus de-
rivative use" immunity was co-extensive with the privilege against
self-incrimination. Judge Friendly noted that although the appellant
in Kastigar was not a defendant but merely a witness, the argument
advanced was identical to that raised by Goldberg: "[H]e argued that
use immunity was insufficient to supplant the privilege . ..because
of the danger that his testimony might ... be used against him .... ,28
The statute, however, prohibits the use of such testimony "in any
20 Id. at 516.
21 Id. at 515.
22 Id. See Memorandum of Appellant at 4.
23 The sections of the statute refer to both a "witness," 18 U.S.C. § 6002, and "any
individual," 18 U.S.C. §§ 6003-05.
24 The court cited testimony by an Assistant Attorney General before the House Judi-
ciary Committee which indicated that a typical situation for the grant of immunity would
exist
where there is an employee who, as an agent of a principal, is familiar with the
entire transaction and the investigation is directed at that particular agent and we
decide as a matter of policy that it is more important to prosecute the principal
than the agent.
472 F.2d at 515, citing Hearings on H.R. 11157 and H.R. 12041 Before Subcomm. No. 3 of
the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 42 (1970) [hereinafter cited as
Hearings on H.R. 11157]. It was felt that such language indicated that the subpoena of
agents "already... arrested or arraigned" was not precluded. 472 F.2d at 515.
For additional legislative discussion of the Federal Immunity of Witnesses Act see
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON REFOni OF FEDERAL CRIUINAL LA/VS, WORING PAPERS (1970);
Measures Relating to Organized Crime, supra note 3.
20472 F.2d at 515. See 18 U.S.C. § 6001 (1970). For a comprehensive list of the statutes
see 116 CONG. REc. 577-78 (1970). See also Measures Relating to Organized Crime, supra
note 3, at App. A.
20 472 F.2d at 515.
27 Id.
28 Id.
1973]
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respect" and Kastigar imposed a "heavy burden on the prosecution
'to prove that the evidence it proposes to use . . . is derived from a
legitimate source wholly independent of the compelled testimony.' "29
As a result, the Second Circuit felt compelled to "accept the Court's
confidence that use and derivative use immunity will in fact prove
to be co-extensive with the privilege against self-incrimination,"30 re-
gardless of whether or not the witness was a defendant.3'
This conclusion appears to be somewhat limited by the dicta
which followed it. Chief Judge Friendly indicated that if the same
grand jury which had heard the compelled testimony of the defendant
subsequently were to indict him, the court "would have the most
serious doubt about the validity of such an indictment."3' 2 The court
reasoned that it would be almost impossible for the grand jurors to
put out of their minds the compelled testimony in considering whether
the evidence presented was sufficient to support an indictment. There-
29 Id., quoting Kastigar v. United States, 406 US. 441, 460-61 (1972). As a way of
meeting this burden of proof, the Second Circuit advised prosecutors to certify any
evidence they have available before compelling testimony. 472 F.2d at 516 n.5. See Note,
Standards for Exclusion in Immunity Cases after Kastigar and Zicarelli, 82 YALE L.J. 171,
181-88 (1972). See also Comment, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term, 86 HARv. L REv. 181,
187-89 (1972).
30472 F.2d at 516.
31 "Neither in logic nor in legislative history nor in practical effect, however, is there
any legitimate distinction between a witness who has not yet been arrested and one who
already has been." Id. (Oakes, J., concurring).
32 Id. The court analogized this situation to cases wherein testimony is obtained in
violation of a defendant's constitutional rights. Even in this area there seems to be some
dispute as to the proper remedy. There is strong precedent for the position that evidence
derived in violatin of an accused's constitutional rights is merely subject to exclusion in
later prosecution. It has not heretofore formed the basis of quashing an indictment. See
United States v. Blue, 884 U.S. 251, 255 & n.8 (1966); Lawn v. United States, 855 U.S. 839,
849-50 (1958); Costello v. United States, 850 U.S. 359 (1956); United States v. Cleary, 265
F.2d 459 (2d Cir. 1959); 8 J. IVIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2184a, at 40 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
The Second Circuit has taken the position that these cases do not foreclose a court
from dismissing an indictment "if a defendant could establish that it was obtained on the
basis of testimony compelled from him after a proper assertion of his privilege." 472 F.2d
at 516 n.4. In support of this position the court cited Jones v. United States, 842 F.2d 863
(D.C. Cir. 1964), which held that "an indictment obtained in violation of federal constitu-
tional rights must be dismissed . 8..." 342 F.2d at 871-72 (footnotes omitted). Jones distin-
guished Lawn and Costello as not involving an abridgment of constitutional rights. The
D.C. Circuit relied on Cassell v. Texas, 389 U.S. 282 (1950), wherein it was held that the
indictment was subject to dismissal if returned by an unconstitutionally composed grand
jury.
It is submitted that a dismissal of the indictment is the only effective and logical
sanction where the same grand jury which heard the compelled testimony also indicts the
accused. If, for example, the prosecution uses tainted evidence at the grand jury level
but does not introduce such evidence at trial there is nothing to suppress. Even if such
evidence is used before the grand jury and at trial, a suppression of evidence at the trial
does not cure the violation which occurred when the grand jury considered such evidence
or testimony. Thus, any violation of the accused's rights which occurs at the grand jury
level can only be cured by dismissing the indictment.
[Vol. 48:332
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fore, such testimony would be used in a manner prohibited by the
statute and lIastigar. Accordingly, the court concluded that
there is no statutory or constitutional bar to prevent the United
States Attorney from compelling a potential defendant in a re-
lated proceeding who has been granted immunity under 18 U.S.C.
§§ 6002 and 6003 to testify before a grand jury which is not being
asked to indict him.33
Although this aspect of the decision imposes upon the prosecu-
torial authorities the additional burden of empaneling a special grand
jury to hear the compelled testimony of an actual defendant, such a
burden is outweighed by the need to protect the accused's rights. In
addition, by extending the application of the Federal Immunity of
Witnesses Act to defendants, the Second Circuit may have formulated
a viable alternative to the much maligned practice of plea bargaining.
Formerly, in order to elicit additional evidence, the prosecution could
"bargain" with a defendant by agreeing to accept a plea of guilty to
a lesser offense in return for information or testimony implicating
higher-ups. Under Goldberg, once the prosecution has accumulated
sufficient information against a particular individual that evidence
may be certified 4 and the accused called before a grand jury. By
granting the accused "use and derivative use" immunity the prosecu-
tion may require the accused to testify as to others under the threat
of a contempt citation. The net result of this process is that rather
than settle for a conviction of a lesser offense in order to prosecute
a higher-up for the offense actually committed, the prosecution may
convict both.
A question arises as to whether any of the participants' constitu-
tional rights would be violated under this procedure. It is submitted
that they would not. The accused would have been indicted anyway
by virtue of the information certified against him prior to granting
him immunity. Therefore he may not claim that his fifth amendment
rights have been violated. Moreover, the principal may not claim
that his fifth amendment rights have been violated because the accused
has been compelled to talk under a threat of contempt. Clearly there
is no constitutional protection against incrimination by third parties.35
The most serious difficulty arises where the prosecution might be
tempted to have the immunized party indicted by the grand jury be-
fore which he testified. It is submitted that such an indictment would
83 472 F.2d at 516 (emphasis added).
34 See note 29 supra.
835 See, e.g., Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322 (1973).
1973]
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violate the fifth amendment. The dicta in the Goldberg decision ac-
knowledged this possibility and cautioned that such a procedure prob-
ably would be invalid.36
In conclusion, Goldberg is consistent with both Kastigar and the
probable intent of Congress in enacting the Federal Immunity of
Witnesses Act.37 It may prove to be a valuable tool for the prosecution.
36 472 F.2d at 516.
37 It should be noted that the Goldberg court relied on some rather weak language to
support its finding of legislative intent. See note 24 supra. More persuasive is this statement:
Mr. Mikva: [T]he immunity from use would apply even if a prosecution were
pending at the time. Is that the case?
Mr. Poff: The immunity from use would apply if a prosecution were pending at
the time.
Hearings on H.R. 11157, supra note 24, at 34.
